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Abstract Entrepreneurial ecosystems (EE) are composed not only of startups but also the organizations
that support them. Theory has been ambivalent about
whether an EE is spatially bounded or includes distant
organizations. This exploratory study uses a time series
of all Internet industry initial public offerings (IPO) to
explore the locational changes not only of startups but
also four key EE service providers: lawyers, investment
bankers, venture capitalists, and board directors. We find
that while the startups became only slightly more concentrated, the EE service providers concentrated more
rapidly, as an industry center in Silicon Valley emerged.
Our results suggest that over the industry life cycle,
industry knowledge exhibits a tendency to spatially concentrate, and this results in a concentration of industryspecific EE service providers that is even greater than
the more gradual concentration of startups. As a result,
startups, wherever they are located, increasingly source
EE services from the industrial knowledge concentration.
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Plain English Summary Using the entire life of
the Internet industry, we show that entrepreneurial
ecosystems are composed of local and extra-local
service providers. Moreover, as the industry matured,
the generic local entrepreneurial support service providers were replaced by those located in the dominant
region which also had developed industry knowledge.
The dominant region’s support providers effectively
became service providers for both local and distant
entrepreneurs. The principal implication of this study
is that local policymakers should understand and
explain to local startups the value of EE members that
are extra-local, as these actors may have intimate and
current industry-specific knowledge necessary to successfully build their firm. Entrepreneurs should weigh
carefully whether it is more efficient to use local
EE service providers or those in the region with the
greatest industry knowledge.
Keywords Entrepreneurial ecosystems · Venture
capital · Internet · Industry knowledge · Law firms ·
Silicon Valley
JEL Classification

M13 · O32 · G24

1 Introduction
Entrepreneurial ecosystems (EEs) are composed of
startups and the organizations that provide assistance
to them, which we term “entrepreneurial support
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organizations” (ESOs) (Bergman & McMullen, 2021;
Feldman, 2001; Roundy et al., 2017).1 Thus, EEs not
only encompass entrepreneurs but also includes other
actors. For example, Spigel (2017) offers a comprehensive list, including human resource advisors,
incubation, acceleration, co-working facilities, mentors, talent, universities, physical infrastructure, and
open markets. Similarly, Mason and Brown (2014)
list recruitment agencies, business consultants, mentors, and support activities, including both “hard (e.g.,
finance) and soft (e.g., advice) resources.” Among
those that provide critical assistance to startups are
venture capitalists (VCs), law firms, and accountants (Mason & Brown, 2014; Spigel, 2017). ESOs
provide specialized services to entrepreneurial firms
and reciprocally benefit when and if the firms are successful. Moreover, as these service providers emerge,
they alter the context within which entrepreneurs’
function (Autio et al., 2014: 1099). There are many
actors in an EE; in this paper, we limit our focus on
four actors—lawyers, investment bankers, venture
capitalists (VCs), and independent board directors—
that play vital roles in the development of fledgling
startups into successful firms.
We explore the premise that knowledge about
entrepreneurship process can be separated from
industry knowledge about what needs to be done to
create a successful firm in an industry (e.g., recruiting management and labor, suppliers, and other firms).
In Fig. 1, we graphically illustrate the proposed relationship between the entrepreneurial firm and entrepreneurial and industry knowledge. What the concept
of industrial clusters (IC), industrial districts (ID), or
regional systems of innovation (RIS) have in common is their interest in the concentration of businesses
within an industry where the industrial knowledge
or industry-specific knowledge resides, while many
EEs are “… agnostic relative to industry or technology domain” (Autio et al., 2018: 77). Hence, what sets
apart EEs from older concepts is the view that knowledge about how to support entrepreneurship is generic
rather than industry-specific. The distinction regarding whether entrepreneurial knowledge is generic or
1
The term “ESO” in the literature often refers to incubators,
accelerators, and small business development centers (Bergman & McMullen, 2021). We use the term more broadly to
refer to VCs, law firms, accountants, and other professional
services that are vital for building a new firm.

Vol:. (1234567890)

13

industry-specific may hold keys to explaining whether
EE actors must be in close proximity to the startup or
whether the services can be supplied from outside the
region (Autio et al., 2014).
This paper explores the spatial relationship
between startups and four types of ESOs over the
Internet industry’s life cycle. Examining startup
activity across the industry life cycle is important
for a number of reasons. First, the level of startup
entry is shaped by technological conditions (Acs
et al., 2021) and industry life cycle, which has bearing on market saturation, competition, survival, and
so forth (Agarwal & Audretsch, 2001). What also
changes across the industry life cycle is the source
and location of financial support or, more specifically, the nature of how startups are funded. Our
research shows that over an industry’s life cycle, the
spatial concentration of ESOs occurs more rapidly
than do the startups.
Agglomeration studies have repeatedly shown
that industry knowledge is embedded in the network
of local firms, suppliers, and other organizations
(Arrow, 1971; Jacobs, 1969; Marshall, 1890; Romer,
1990). These studies confirm that organizations
are embedded networks that co-produce particular
products or services and knowledge. Of course, the
embedded networks operate within regional contexts, which is an important point emphasized by
Storper and Venables (2004: 357), who wrote, “…
tacit and metaphorical knowledge is embedded in
specific contexts.” Regional innovation systems
scholars observed that particular regions specialized
in industry-specific innovations that were the result
of knowledge that was endogenously developed
(Cooke, 2001). This insight was extended by those
studying EEs to suggest that certain regions came to
specialize in creating new firms.
The formation of regional industry entrepreneurship was vital as new firms catalyzed the exploitation of new technologies and, as a result, often created new regions (Klepper, 2002; Klepper & Sleeper,
2005; Morrison & Boschma, 2019; Neffke et al.,
2018). More recently, scholars have suggested that
certain regions become hosts for specialized intermediaries that support and encourage entrepreneurship
(Isenberg, 2010; Spigel, 2017; Spigel & Harrison,
2018) and that these intermediaries are capable of
supporting startups outside their region.
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Fig. 1  The two types of knowledge that impact the firms in an entrepreneurial ecosystem

This population of organizations specialized in
supporting entrepreneurs can be understood as an
“entrepreneurial support network” (ESN) (Kenney
& Patton, 2005). Although organizations that support entrepreneurship are at the heart of EE theorizing, few studies have been conducted on the coevolution of the location of startups and ESOs and how it
interacts with the location of industry knowledge as
an industry matures. Even less exploration has been
done on the relationship between an industry life
cycle and ESO geography, though it is implicit in the
work of scholars such as Steven Klepper (2002, 2010;
Buenstorf & Klepper, 2010) and in the EE concept
(Acs et al., 2017; Spigel, 2017). Thus, because of the
difficulty in identifying the “…surrounding support
infrastructure” (Mack & Mayer, 2016: 2121) or the
network of EE players in a way that enables analysis,
the literature has an important gap. To address this
gap, our study explores changes in the geography of
a population of the most successful Internet firms and
the organizations that supported them.
Recently, important progress has been made in
terms of understanding the relationship between an
EE and its region. For example, Vedula and Fitza
(2019) and Vedula and Kim (2019) show that a
higher-quality regional EE contributes to the survival
of entrepreneurial firms. Because our interest is in the
evolutionary relationship between ESOs and startups,
we employ a different strategy. We examined data
from the entire population of startups that undertook
an initial public offering (IPO) from the inception of
the Internet industry in 1994 until 2017. This allowed
us to identify changes in the location of IPO firms
and their affiliated VCs, lawyers, investment bankers,

and independent board members. This data makes
it possible to capture the changing geography of the
successive IPOs with their affiliated ESOs and thus
to measure changes in the spatial location of ESO
members over an industry’s life cycle and to correlate
that with the location of the startup firm. This methodology enables us to better understand the interaction between industrial and entrepreneurial support
expertise.
In Sect. 2, we explore the previous literature on
industrial cluster life cycles, EEs, and ESOs. Section 3 presents our propositions regarding the evolution of the locational relationship between the focal
IPO firm and the type of ESO actor. In Sect. 4, we
provide a brief history of the Internet industry as a
context for our study, and we describe the data collection methodology. Section 5 describes the results and
their implications for understanding the relationship
between EE knowledge and industrial knowledge and
how this changed as the Internet industry has evolved.
In Sect. 6, the overall results as well as their implications are discussed. In the conclusion, we discuss the
limitations of this study and possible new research
directions.
2 Industrial cluster life cycles and entrepreneurial
ecosystems
2.1 Industrial cluster life cycles
Life cycle models are primarily used to explain the
growth and development of regional industries (e.g.,
Feldman et al., 2005; Menzel & Fornahl, 2010). The
Vol.: (0123456789)
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stage in their life cycle has implications for the ways
in which firms in an industry evolve and compete
(Klepper, 1997; Menzel & Fornahl, 2010; Ter Wal &
Boschma, 2011). Not surprisingly, studies of industrial cluster strongly suggest that clusters experience
a life cycle closely related to, but not identical to, the
life cycle of the underlying industry of the cluster. Of
course, particularly dynamic clusters can transition
from one industry to another, as, for example, Tuttlingen, Germany, transitioned from making swords
to surgical instruments (Halder, 2004). A more systematic study done by Kim et al. (2022) derives a
theoretically grounded measure of cluster dynamics,
which they call cluster motion, and in examining the
US computer and semiconductor industries, they document the dynamic nature of clusters both within and
across regions.
There is evidence that the initial location of a
cluster can be random and often impossible to predict beforehand (Storper & Walker, 1989). The reasons for a cluster’s emergence are usually explained
after the fact, but evidence suggests that new industries grow out of related industries in a “branching
process,” in which new, often surprising, activities
spin out of existing activities (Frenken & Boschma,
2007; Jacobs, 1969). In studies of the automotive,
television, and tire industries, Klepper (2002) confirmed that the likelihood of a new industry entrant
in a region was higher if it had existing related firms
there. This is largely because the individuals best
equipped to launch new ventures in a particular field
are high-level employees at established companies in
the same or a closely adjacent field (Aldrich, 1999;
Klepper, 2002; Klepper & Sleeper, 2005; Sorenson
& Audia, 2000).
The role of networks has been given significant
attention for understanding cluster life cycles (Ter
Wal & Boschma, 2011). Typically, a dominant design
emerges as the new industry expands (Anderson &
Tushman, 1990). In a successful new industry, the
number of new firms increases rapidly with an internal stable core–periphery network. Spatially, industrial clustering becomes evident. Regions where there
are fewer firms are expected to experience a gradual
decline in their share of startups as the “window of
locational opportunity” closes (Storper & Walker,
1989). Accordingly, these regions should experience
a dramatic decline in entrepreneurship in the maturing industry.
Vol:. (1234567890)
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A related line of research places spinoffs at the
center of the clustering process even in the absence
of agglomeration economies. Sorenson and Audia
(2000) found that no agglomeration economies were
required to explain clustering, as increases in firm
density in the early stages of the cluster raised the rate
of both firm entry and firm exit. Because of imperfect information, new firms concentrated near incumbents even in the absence of cluster-based advantages described by Marshall (Boschma, 2015). Steve
Klepper (2002) found that firm heritage and spinoff
dynamics explained clustering. The emergence of a
cluster is explained by the spatially linked capabilities
of firms and their progeny. Both of these approaches
suggest that the geographical concentration of firms
increases as the industry matures.
2.2 Entrepreneurial ecosystems
EE draws its lineage from strategy and regional science disciplines whose principal focus were in understanding the varied performance of firms and regions,
respectively (Acs et al., 2017). The idea that the geographic concentration of economic activities could
improve productivity dates back to Alfred Marshall
(1890). After Marshall, there was a nearly five-decade
hiatus in research on industrial clusters, roughly coinciding with the dominance of the vertically integrated
firm. Research by economic geographers on industrial
clusters advanced rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s, as
researchers such as Michael Piore and Charles Sabel
(1984) and then AnnaLee Saxenian (1994) interpreted
high-technology regions such as SV as industrial
clusters. In 1998, Michael Porter (1998) synthesized
this work and suggested that the sectoral, geographical, and socio-economic network attributes of clusters
were vital to understanding business strategy.
The increased importance of entrepreneurship in
economic development led to the introduction of the
concept of “entrepreneurial ecosystems.” What differentiates EE from a family of related concepts, such
as industrial districts, regional industrial clusters,
and regional innovation systems, is its starting point
that is neither the market nor the government but the
entrepreneur (Stam & Spigel, 2016). The ongoing
vertical disintegration made startups and small businesses the regions’ engines of economic development. EE theorists suggested that individual agency
and the interaction among agents were missing from
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contemporary discussions. Another important distinction is that unlike other concepts that focused on the
additive aspects of elements, ecosystem considers the
complementarity and the combinatorial process of
these elements. However, it was also observed that
the idea of EEs was as much of a policy construct as it
is an academic concept for scientific study (Malecki,
2018). Broadly defined, an entrepreneurial ecosystem
is a “… a set of interdependent actors and factors
coordinated in such a way that they enable productive
entrepreneurship” (Stam, 2015).
The interest in EE is increasing dramatically. In a
recent study, Rocha and Audretsch (2022) found that
academic publications on industrial districts and clusters were declining, even as publications on regional
clusters were growing gradually, while studies on EE
were growing exponentially. Their conclusion was
that industrial district and cluster concepts were constructed for industrial analysis, which were insightful
to examining the manufacturing sector but less useful
in explaining the advent of the IT revolution and the
importance of SV-type startups. The EE framework,
by contrast, is very useful because of its focus on digital startups/entrepreneurs rather than incumbents and
large firms. For them, agglomeration was still important, but now it mattered for different reasons: not for
economies of scale but for EE’s networks, talent, and
knowledge. Our research reinforces their findings, as
we show SV ESOs built industry-specific knowledge
that made them attractive to successful Internet firms
no matter where they were located.
The key constituents of an EE are a variety of
organizations that specialize in providing services
to entrepreneurs. Andersson and Hellerstedt (2009)
find an important role of knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) in the innovation and growth
of regions, specifically in startups. They find that as
much as three quarters of KIBS founders in Sweden
had prior work experience in the sector. This is precisely the value of ESOs. Although entrepreneurship
is a fundamentally local phenomenon, scholars have
also recognized the role of distant ESOs (see Brown
& Mason, 2017; Spigel, 2017). The importance of
these conduits is recognized by Ter Wal and Boschma
(2011), who maintain that the cluster literature overstates the importance of proximity and underplays the
role of extra-regional network actors. Our research
confirms the ability of ESO actors to serve distant
clients while also showing that the ESOs themselves

become more concentrated in the location of deep
industry knowledge—something that makes them
more effective at providing what are understood to be
generic ESO services.
Despite being central to the definition of an
ecosystem, actors other than entrepreneurial firms
and venture capitalists have received limited attention. EEs, like biological ecosystems, are communities that include not just entrepreneurs but also
a variety of other actors, such as VCs, law firms,
and accountants that provide specialized services
for entrepreneurial firms (Clayton et al., 2018) and
benefit when the entrepreneurial firm is successful
(Kenney & von Burg, 2000). Essentially, an EE is a
set of actors and institutions that assist in the creation and growth of startups. These actors are independent from the entrepreneurial firms and create
value through their interaction with these firms.
Another key feature of the EE framework is its
focus on complex interactions among actors and factors that facilitate co-existence, co-dependence, and
coevolution (Acs et al., 2014, 2017). The EE approach
overcomes the limitations of industry-level analysis as it departs from binaries such as intra vs. interindustry or local competition vs. monopoly research
and directs attention to the dynamic interaction of key
agents and the evolutionary processes of EEs.
The EE, much like industry studies, also elevated the role of knowledge but recognizes two
types of knowledge. The first type of knowledge is
the knowledge possessed and shared by individuals and firms in the cluster regarding the production
and marketing of products and/or services (Autio
et al., 2018) that is industry-specific. The second
type of knowledge is generic as it can be applied
across entrepreneurship opportunities and is shared
through an EE by networks of entrepreneurs and the
actors that assist them (Stam & Spigel, 2016: 5).
The relationships among these actors and firms, and
how they influence each other, are conceptualized
as analogous to the interactions among organisms in
a biological ecosystem (Spigel, 2017).
Both industrial and entrepreneurial process
knowledge can be diffused through an EE by a variety of actors, both local and distant.2 Brown and
2

The adjacent literature on knowledge spillover more directly
examines the process of diffusion (for more, see Acs et al.,
2009).
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Mason (2017) refer to these EE actors as entrepreneurial connectors and a dynamic EE has networks
of such actors in abundance. These social and professional networks include specialized financial
intermediaries, such as the VCs in regions like the
greater Silicon Valley (SV) region (Feldman &
Zoller, 2012; Florida & Kenney, 1988a, 1988b).
While the EE networks are expected to be embedded in an information flow or “buzz” based on faceto-face contacts, these networks need not be either
exclusively local or industry based (Bathelt et al.,
2004; Storper & Venables, 2004).
As EEs have become conceptually popular,
scholars have recognized that there are gaps in our
knowledge about the operation and evolution of EEs
(Alvedalen & Boschma, 2017; Stam, 2015). Only
recently have researchers begun studying the spatial
dimensions of the ESOs (Vedula & Fitza, 2019), and
even fewer study the spatial evolution of their relationships within an industry over time. The paucity
of empirical studies is widely acknowledged (Brown
& Mason, 2017; Malecki, 2018; Spigel, 2017), as are
the difficulties faced, including the choice of appropriate metrics and the appropriate regional scale to be
examined.
There are three interrelated issues with measuring EEs: skewness, lagged performance, and multiple
levels of geographic analysis (Andrews et al., 2022).
Most entrepreneurship research focuses upon small
businesses, most of which do not grow. Only a small
fraction becomes high-growth firms (HGFs). And
an even small number of these HGFs become VCbacked unicorns (startups valued at more than $1 billion) and eventually list with an IPO. Measurement of
an EE then needs to assess its region’s performance
on the skewed outcome of a few very successful
firms. Another concern has to do with lagged performance of EEs. Assigning the entrepreneurial ventures to a region’s EE is an empirically difficult task
because there is usually a considerable lag between
when the EE forms and when its startup rates are
observed empirically. Finally, determining what level
of geographic analysis to use (e.g., zip code, county,
commuting zone, MSA) is a tricky subject because
EE’s spatial boundaries are not clearly defined.
To control skewness, Andrews et al. (2022)
and Guzman and Stern (2020) offer a predictive
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analytic approach that assesses EEs based on
both quality and quantity of startup activities.
In contrast, to overcome the challenges of geographic analyses, Leendertse et al. (2021) propose a standardized index-based metric to measure EEs. But one commonly mentioned problem
concerns the shortage of cross-sectional and
longitudinal empirical research (Mack & Mayer,
2016), which makes accounting for lagged performance difficult. One suggested empirical approach stresses the processes that create
resources within an EE and how entrepreneurs
access these resources (Spigel & Harrison,
2018). Applying this approach requires measuring the phenomenon consistently over time
and across comparable regions within the same
industry, preferably beginning at the inception of
the industry. Moreover, the metric chosen must
in some way capture the resources created within
the EE and accessed by entrepreneurs in all
regions involved in the industry. We argue that
the geographical distribution of the members
of the ESN should change over time, and these
changes can offer new insights into the evolution of EEs (Balland et al., 2015; Frenken et al.,
2015).
Both geographic and lagged performance challenges are addressed in this study, which covers the
entire life of an industry and thus provides an optic
to understand how the geography of key EE service
providers evolves over time.
2.3 Cluster life cycles and the evolution of
entrepreneurial ecosystems
While industry life cycle models can be quite specific as to the degree to which firms concentrate geographically over the stages of the industry, there is
less theorizing about the geographical evolution of
EEs even as it widely appreciated that EEs are not
static but rather evolve (Malecki, 2018; Spigel, 2017).
The most notable of the EE life cycle models found
in the literature is that developed by Mack and Mayer
(2016) and the model proposed by Mason and Brown
(2014). Mack and Mayer’s model deals with EE
development in a stylized manner much like Menzel
and Fornahl (2010) in their industry life cycle model.
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EEs, like clusters, pass through four stages: birth,
growth, sustainment, and decline in Mack and Mayer’s model. In the birth stage, the components of the
EE are underdeveloped, and finance capital is limited.
In the growth stage, the EE develops as more entrepreneurs emerge, and networks among entrepreneurs
become denser. In the sustainment stage, firm births
decline, deaths increase, and market opportunities
begin to weaken. If EE actors cannot extend the sustainment stage, the EE may atrophy or decline (Mack
& Mayer, 2016: 2121–2124).
A dynamic model that relies upon the role spinoffs play in the development of a cluster has been
proposed by Mason and Brown (2014). This model
resembles Klepper’s model of industry life cycles.
EEs evolve from an embryonic stage (few startups,
few dealmakers, and limited VC) to a scale-up stage
characterized by many new firms and a dense EE.
The primary means by which this transition occurs
is through a spinoff process where local successful
firms become the source of further new firm formation. This spinoff process does more than produce new firms; it also ignites a process of entrepreneurial recycling that results in the transfer of
entrepreneurial learning within the EE through the
generation of dealmakers, advisors, venture capitalists, and non-executive directors to the EE (Brown
& Mason, 2017: 18).
These resemble the model developed by Feldman
et al. (2005) in explaining the role of entrepreneurs
in building industrial clusters, Brown and Mason’s
model shows how entrepreneurs in the process of
building a firm not only contribute to the development of an industrial cluster, but also contribute
to the evolution of the EE within the cluster. This
model while useful may not capture the dynamic
in systemically important new industries, because,
as we show, over time, four key EE constituents
become less local and concentrate in one region,
SV. Effectively, firm entrepreneurship continued
nationally, but certain key EE services became
markedly more spatially concentrated.
3 Propositions regarding the focal firm and its
ESOs
The four EE actors examined in this study are a
subset of the actors and institutions that comprise

an entrepreneurial ecosystem, but they are among
the most important actors in an EE. Moreover,
these actors are well defined as is the nature of
their relationship to each other and to the focal
firm they are assisting. 3 This precision of definition and characterization of the interactions
among these actors addresses a criticism made of
the EE approach that it does not present a clear
analytical framework that explicitly indicates the
nature of the causal relation among actors advancing entrepreneurship (Stam, 2015).
Due to the difficulty in collecting data, most
studies of EE are based on a static framework that
describes relationships within an EE while not
considering how these relationships have evolved
(Alvedalen & Boschma, 2017). Because geographical information on these four actors is presented
accurately and consistently for these firms in their
IPO registration documents, this study is both a
cross-sectional analysis and a dynamic analysis of
an entrepreneurial support network, for specific
entrepreneurial functions in a single industry since
its inception.
In this section, we state our expectations regarding the changes in the spatial distribution of our EE
actors over the life cycle of the Internet industry. To
reiterate, the industrial life cycle literature suggests
increasing concentration in terms of the location of
firm entrants but has given far less attention to the EE
member location.
3

Any description of an EE for purposes of analysis cannot
include every actor that may conceivably contribute to regional
entrepreneurship. For example, we were unable to assemble
data on leadership, culture, regulations, tax policies, business consortiums (business associations, trade unions), angel
investors, and physical infrastructure. Spigel’s (2015:56) relational configuration of an EE lists several actors in the areas of
finance (VC director), mentoring (non-VC director), and support services (firm lawyer and investment banker) that assist in
the promotion of regional entrepreneurship that may exist in
any region. While universities and support service incubators
are material attributes with a tangible presence in a region, we
were unable to consistently identify them for every IPO. The
accelerator/incubator roles of mentorship, learning from peers
and credentialing often overlap with what VCs do; and not
surprisingly, many VCs are active and instrumental within the
accelerator/incubator communities. We suspect that universities, in particular, would play a much more important role in
a study of EEs in the history of the biotechnology industry and
that their importance would be revealed in the founding of biotech IPOs.
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3.1 Focal Internet firms: startups and those
undertaking an IPO
Explanations of clusters based on either agglomeration economies (Marshall, 1890) or firm inheritance (Klepper, 2010) suggest that firms and industry knowledge will tend to concentrate over time.4
Because in the USA new firm formation in the information technology industries nearly always requires
venture capital investment, we confined the firms
in our study to those funded by venture capitalists.
Given the remarkable strength of the SV, observers
assumed it would rapidly become the dominant location for new firm entrants (Zook, 2002). Therefore,
we propose that:
Proposition 1: As the industry matures, the proportion of new Internet firms will become more spatially concentrated.
Proposition 2: As the industry matures, the proportion of Internet IPOs will become more spatially
concentrated.
3.2 The focal firm’s law firm
Capable legal counsel is vital for incorporating a
startup in a way that can accommodate rapid growth
and preparing the firm for the corporate governance
changes necessary when receiving venture capital and later undertaking an exit (Suchman, 2000).
The intimacy of the relationship between the firm’s
founder(s) and its counsel suggests that they will be
located in close proximity to each other. Yet lawyers
embedded in an EE where substantial industry knowledge has accumulated might offset the advantage of
less knowledgeable lawyers located close to the focal
firm. For this reason, we propose that at the inception
of an industry, when industry-specific knowledge is
scattered and thus there is no advantage to having a
distant lawyer, local ones are likely to be predominant. However, if industrial knowledge concentrates
regionally, the presence of lawyers located in the
industrially dominant region is likely to increase:
4
Klepper’s study of the automobile and television industries
shows that increased concentration over time is the industrial
pattern most commonly observed, but that there are exceptions
such as the television industry due to differences in the initial
geography of industrial knowledge (Klepper 2003: 2–3).
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Proposition 3: In the industry’s early phase, the
firm’s lawyer will likely be spatially proximate.
As the industry matures, the startups will be more
likely to choose a lawyer located in the dominant region that is the site of the most industrial
knowledge.
3.3 Investment bankers
Investment bankers (IBs) collaborate with the
firm’s management and existing investors to prepare
the firm for a public offering. Investment bankers
have been concentrated in New York City (NYC),
but other regions and, in particular, SV have local
investment bankers (Kenney, 2000). Therefore,
in the early stages, we expect the lead investment
bankers to be dispersed but with significant concentrations in both SV and NYC. However, as the
industry matures and industry knowledge concentrates, we expect a shift to the region where the
Internet industry knowledge, as opposed to investment banking knowledge, is concentrated. Therefore, we propose that:
Proposition 4: In the industry’s early phase, the
IBs will have noticeable concentrations in NYC
and SV, but as the industry matures, startups are
more likely to recruit their IB from SV where the
Internet industry knowledge has become concentrated.
3.4 Venture capitalist board members
VCs are central EE actors because they provide the
funds, advice, and connections that contribute to
startup growth (Florida & Kenney, 1988a, 1988b;
Gompers & Lerner, 2004). Ample evidence suggests
that VCs prefer to invest in firms in close proximity
to their offices (Chen et al., 2010; Florida & Kenney,
1988a; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Since the 1980s,
venture capital, while remaining concentrated in SV,
NYC, and Boston, has dispersed. Therefore, we propose that:
Proposition 5: Initially, the VC directors will be
dispersed, and firms will access VC from a variety
of locations; however, as industry knowledge con-
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centrates, firms will increasingly use VC directors
from the dominant region.
3.5 Non‑venture capitalist board members
Non-VC directors assist firms in a variety of ways,
such as, providing connections, advice, signaling
quality to investors, and contributing to corporate
governance (Pfeffer, 1972). The variety of services
performed suggests that when there is no concentration of industry knowledge, the non-VC directors are
likely to be spatially dispersed. However, as the industry and knowledge concentrates, we would expect the
concentration of non-VC directors to increase in the
emerging dominant region:
Proposition 6: Initially, the non-VC directors will
be widely dispersed, and firms will access knowledge extra-regionally; as the industry matures
and industry knowledge is concentrated, firms
will appoint non-VC directors from the dominant
region.
4 Setting, data, and methodology
The knowledge necessary to establish an Internet firm
was widespread at the inception of the industry. The
Internet began as a federally funded network (known
as ARPAnet) and connected universities across the
country. Further, the crucial creation of a “language”
for creating websites was undertaken at CERN in
Geneva, Switzerland, in 1992, and this was provided
to any interested parties. The early Internet browsers
were developed at universities around the world, and
the most famous of these, Mosaic, was developed at
the University of Illinois and provided freely to all.
These open-source building blocks for Internet applications were widely available. This suggests that
the basic knowledge necessary to enter the fledgling
internet industry was not initially concentrated in any
particular location. Not surprisingly, technologies
were developed, and websites emerged in a variety of
locations (Zook, 2006). Recognizing the opportunity,
VCs almost immediately began funding startups seeking to commercialize the Internet.
The opportunity ignited a Schumpeterian gold
rush, as entrepreneurs formed new firms. The rapid

adoption of the Internet and growth of these new
firms was accompanied by enormous excitement and
a public desperate to purchase shares in new Internet
firm listings. A flood of IPOs ignited what came to
be known as the “dot-com bubble.” In 1999 and early
2000 and at the height of the frenzy, as Fig. 2 shows,
there were 308 Internet IPOs. Then, the market collapsed, and hundreds of these firms went bankrupt
with investors suffering tremendous losses. For a decade, there were few Internet IPOs. It was only during the recovery from the 2008/2009 stock market
collapse, the emergence of the Web 2.0, and the corresponding surge in Internet and smartphone use that
investors again became receptive to Internet IPOs.
For this reason, we divided the industry history
and population of 581 Internet IPOs into three periods based on the investment context. As Fig. 2 illustrates, Period 1 was from 1995 to the dot-com burst in
2000. During Period 2, from 2001 to the beginning of
the Great Recession in 2008, few IPOs occurred, and
thus, we drop this period from further analysis. Period
3 was from 2009 to 2017. Because of our focus on the
locational changes and to dampen annual variations,
our analysis compares the differences between Periods 1 and 3.
Our data includes only startups that had never been
listed before and were not spinoffs of an existing firm.
The information was extracted from US Securities
and Exchange Commission filings. The locational
data was established by Internet searches. The underwriters’ law firm’s address was used to infer the location of the lead investment banker (thus, this location
is approximate). We searched for the address of every
VC on the board of directors, and, following Chen
et al. (2010), we attributed the individual’s location to
their actual location, not the VC firm’s headquarters.
5 Results
Given that our time period is 23 years, we expected
that the industry would exhibit the clustering that
often accompanies maturity. The Internet industry
contrasts to many industries where maturity sets in
relatively soon and new entrance stops. In the Internet industry, while there were fewer firms established
and conducting IPOs in Period 3 than in Period 1,
the flow of IPOs revived from the previous decade.
In Table 1, we provide the changes in concentration
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Fig. 2  Internet IPOs by
year and periods, 1995–
2017, n = 581

between the two periods with respect to SV, which
became the dominant region. Our first six propositions, derived from theory, confirm our expectations of both increased industrial concentration and
increased ESO concentration.
5.1 Location of VC‑funded Internet firms and those
undertaking an IPO
From the previous literature, it was expected that
the spatial concentration in terms of both startups
and IPOs would increase (Propositions 1 and 2). As
Table 2 indicates, SV that was already significant
in Period 1 became more central in Period 3 but
clearly was not dominant. The number of SV startups
increased from 19.4% in Period 1 to 29% in Period 3
of the total in each period—its share of total startups

Table 1  Propositions,
percentages in Periods 1,
2, and 3 and inter-period
change for the SV region
Proposition 1: VC-Backed startups
Proposition 2: IPOs
Proposition 3: law firms
Proposition 4: investment banks
Proposition 5: venture capital
Proposition 6: non-VC directors
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increased significantly. This provides evidence that
industry knowledge was increasing in SV. The greatest declines were in the weaker regions. This startup
data partially confirms previous results and shows an
increased concentration of industry knowledge and
presumably entrepreneurial inspiration (Buenstorf &
Klepper, 2010; Klepper, 2010; Sorenson & Audia,
2000; Vedula & Fitza, 2019). Yet, even in Period 3,
entrepreneurs around the country continue to establish new and successful startups.
In all three periods, SV had a greater percentage of
startups than any other region. This success is almost
certainly due to the strength of the existing EE but
also the presence of firms in adjacent industries. In
contrast, in Period 2, SV actually lost market share in
terms of IPOs, possibly because it reacted more forcibly to the collapse of the public market for Internet

Period 1
1995–2000
(%)

Period 2
2001–2008
(%)

Period 3
2009–2017
(%)

Change from
Period 1 to Period
3 (%)

19.4
33.4
38.6
42.7
49.0
22.7

22.2
28.1
35.9
35.9
59.6
24.9

29.0
38.5
47.3
52.0
72.1
46.2

+ 9.6
+ 5.1
+ 8.7
+ 9.3
+ 23.1
+ 23.5
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Table 2  Measurement of IPO and venture capital-funded startup concentration by periods (in percent)

All Internet startups*
Period 1
1995–2000
Period 2
2000–2008
Period 3
2009–2017
Period 3 minus Period 1
IPOs
Period 1
1995–2000
Period 2
2000–2008
Period 3
2009–2017
Period 3 minus Period 1

SV

Mass

NYC

SoCal

Second tier
(n = 3)

Other regions

19.4

5.6

11.5

11.0

12.3

40.3

22.2

5.6

10.9

10.6

12.9

37.8

29.0

3.7

15.3

11.7

10.6

29.6

9.6

− 1.9

3.8

0.7

− 1.7

− 10.7

33.4

9.5

9.5

8.2

13.9

25.5

28.1

10.9

4.7

12.5

15.6

28.1

38.5

7.4

8.1

10.8

13.5

21.6

5.1

− 2.1

− 1.4

2.6

− 0.4

− 3.9

Source: Crunchbase, accessed June 16, 2020
*9954 startups with more than 10 employees classified as Internet services. See Appendix Table 12 for definitions of the regions

Table 3  Herfindahl–Hirschman index for Internet IPOs, startups, and EE actors over eleven regions for Periods 1, 2, and 3

Period 1
1995–2000
Period 2
2001–2008
Period 3
2009–2017
Period 3/Period 1

Internet startups

Internet IPOs

Law firms

Investment
bankers

VC directors

Non-VC
directors

0.11

0.16

0.20

0.26

0.28

0.12

0.12

0.14

0.18

0.21

0.39

0.13

0.15

0.19

0.27

0.33

0.53

0.25

1.3

1.2

1.4

1.3

1.9

2.1

firms. While the proportion of firms established in SV
has increased, it has not yet resulted in the winnertake-all spatial pattern described in the literature,
either in terms of startups or IPOs—entry and success
was still possible outside Silicon Valley.
To examine these changes statistically, we use Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) that measures concentration.5 The index measures the concentration
of firms or EE actors over 11 regions; however, it is
∑11
The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index is defined as H = i=1 Si2
where Si is the proportion in region i of the total number of
firms or actors in 11 regions. H increases as regional shares are
more concentrated and therefore more unequal.

5

important to recognize that the regions differ massively in size as SV is the San Francisco Bay Area,
while a number of other regions are comprised of
multiple states (see Appendix Table 12).
The level of regional HHI concentration differs
among EE actors. As can be seen in Table 3, the concentration in Period 3 is the lowest among the startups and IPOs, and the increase has been relatively
minor. In particular, and surprisingly, there was a
slight decrease in the concentration in IPOs. As we
expected, the concentration increased for each of the
four EE actors. For the law firms that were already
only slightly more concentrated than the IPO firms,
Vol.: (0123456789)

13

Y. Li et al.
Table 4  Company law firms by location of source and target in Period 1
Source (location of law firm)
Target (location of focal Mass
firm)

NYC

SoCal

SV

Other

Total

Target % of total

Massachusetts
New York
Southern CA
Silicon Valley
Other
Total
Source % of total

1
32
2
0
11
46
12.5%

0
0
18
2
1
21
5.7%

1
0
9
119
13
142
38.6%

1
2
1
2
110
116
31.5%

35
35
30
123
145
368
100%

9.5%
9.5%
8.2%
33.4%
39.4%
100%
81.5% local

32
1
0
0
10
43
11.7%

The “Other” category includes the other seven regions. See Appendix Table 12

Table 5  Company law firms by location of source and target in Period 3
Source (location of law firm)
Target (location of focal Mass
firm)

NYC

SoCal

SV

Other†

Total

Target % of total

Massachusetts
New York
Southern CA
Silicon Valley
Other
Total
Source % of total

0
10
1
0
10
21
14.2%

1
0
8
0
1
10
6.8%

0
0
7
57
6
70
47.3%

0
0
0
0
32
32
21.6%

11
12
16
57
52
148
100%

7.4%
8.1%
10.8%
38.5%
35.1%
100%
74.3% local

10
2
0
0
3
15
10.1%

The “Other” category includes the other seven regions

the service did increase. The investment bankers
were already quite concentrated regionally, and this
increased to 0.33, which is considered high concentration. The most remarkable percentage increases
occurred among VC and non-VC directors, though
the ratios are quite different. In terms of VC directors,
the Period 3 HHI of 0.53 indicates extremely high
concentration as SV became the dominant region. For
non-VC directors, the ratio of change was the greatest
of all as the location of non-VC directors concentrated
significantly and overtook that of the startups, themselves. In the following sections, we discuss these
changes for each of the four key EE constituents.
5.2 Company law firms
Given the intimacy of the relationship a startup has
with its legal counsel, we expected that in Period 1,
the firms’ counsel would be spatially proximate. Our
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expectation was that the power of proximity would
decline as the industry matured and its knowledge
became more spatially concentrated. In Period 1, as
Table 4 shows, 81.5% of all IPOs were served by local
law firms. This was particularly evident in SV where
119 of 123 IPOs were served locally. However, SV
lawyers served 23 firms outside the region. In agreement with our expectations, as shown in Table 5,
in Period 3, the number of firms serviced locally
decreased to 74.3%. The change was that SV lawyers
increased their share of the total by 8.7%, with most
of the gain due to it servicing all of its local IPOs.
NYC also slightly increased its share. Despite these
increases, legal counsel remained proximate though
there was a 7.2% increase in inter-regional servicing.
With regard to this most intimate of EE services, the
attraction of distant and presumably more capable
legal service providers increased only slightly. Our
results suggest that the increasing concentration of
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Table 6  Lead investment banker by location of source and target in Period 1
Source (location of investment banker)
Target (location of focal Mass
firm)

NYC

SoCal

SV

Other

Total

Target % of total

Massachusetts
New York
Southern CA
Silicon Valley
Other
Total
Source % of total

4
24
2
3
46
79
21.5%

0
0
10
8
2
20
5.4%

1
0
17
109
30
157
42.7%

2
4
1
3
51
61
16.6%

35
35
30
123
145
368
100%

9.5%
9.5%
8.2%
33,4%
39.4%
100%
57.1% local

28
7
0
0
16
51
13.9%

The “Other” category includes the other seven regions
Table 7  Lead investment banker by location of source and target in Period 3
Source (location of investment banker)
Target (location of focal Mass
firm)

NYC

SoCal

SV

Other

Total

Target % of total

Massachusetts
New York
Southern CA
Silicon Valley
Other
Total
Source % of total

1
6
2
0
17
26
17.6%

0
1
5
0
3
9
6.1%

1
1
9
57
9
77
52.0%

0
2
0
0
15
17
11.5%

11
12
16
57
52
148
100%

7.4%
8.1%
10.8%
38.5%
35.1%
100%
60.1% local

9
2
0
0
8
19
12.8%

The “Other” category includes the other seven regions

industry knowledge had only a minor effect in eroding importance of proximity.
5.3 Lead investment banker
The lead IB shepherds the focal firm through the IPO
process and thus joins the firm’s ESN relatively late.
As Proposition 4 suggested, we expected Internet
industry knowledge would become increasingly more
important than general EE knowledge; therefore, the
IB would increasingly be located in SV. As Tables 6
and 7 show, this proposition was confirmed as SV
increased its IPO share from 42.7 to 52%. The high
initial market share was almost certainly a legacy of
the fact that SV IBs already had significant experience with technology IPOs. In Period 3, SV IBs took
market share from the other regions (except SoCal).
NYC, which was and is the headquarters for the most
important IBs, is particularly interesting because it

experienced a significant loss of market share even
for its own IPOs. Increasing industry knowledge
dominated IB industry skills with which NYC is
amply endowed. Once again, SV firms were no longer
served by external IBs; it had become autarchic. For
IBs, industry knowledge appears to have tipped the
decision by entrepreneurs to use IBs in SV.
5.4 Venture capital directors
Because of the dispersed and minimal initial industry knowledge, in Proposition 5, we suggested that in
Period 1, VC investment would be dispersed and, as
the previous literature has shown, VCs would invest
locally (Florida & Kenney, 1988b; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). The expectation was that, in Period 3, as
industry knowledge increased, the local bias would be
overcome, and entrepreneurs would source their venture capital from the dominant region.
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Table 8  Venture capital directors by location source and target in Period 1
Source (location of venture capital director)
Target (location of focal
firm)

Mass

NYC

SoCal

SV

Other

Total

Target % of total

Massachusetts
New York
Southern CA
Silicon Valley
Other
Total
Source % of total

37
4
6
16
14
77
12.7

4
18
5
13
24
64
10.5

0
1
13
7
5
26
4.3

12
7
22
201
56
298
49.0

11
9
6
33
84
143
23.5

64
39
52
270
183
608
100

10.5
6.4
8.6
44.4
30.1
100
52.5 local

The “Other” category includes the other seven regions

Table 9  Venture capital directors by location of source and target in Period 3
Source (location of venture capital director)
Target (location of focal
firm)

Mass

NYC

SoCal

SV

Other

Total

Target % of total

Massachusetts
New York
Southern CA
Silicon Valley
Other
Total
Source % of total

3
1
2
4
5
15
4.6

0
6
2
2
6
16
4.9

1
1
6
2
2
12
3.7

17
16
18
129
55
235
72.1

2
11
4
5
26
48
14.7

23
35
32
142
94
326
100

7.1
10.7
9.8
43.6
28.8
100
49.4 local

The “Other” category includes the other seven regions

As we expected, in Period 1, there was a remarkable amount of extra-regional investment. SV did
benefit because of its legacy as a technology-driven
VC concentration, as it already was the home of
49.0% of all VC investors (Table 8). Moreover, due to
SV’s existing concentration of VCs, one might have
expected it to be largely autarchic. And yet, in Period
1, 25.6% of SV VC directors were extra-regional.
NYC and Boston VCs were active and supplied more
VC directors outside their regions than they did internally. In this early period, when industry knowledge
still remained dispersed; VCs from other regions
could participate.
In Period 3, the situation changed dramatically
(see Table 9). Now, 72.1% of all the VCs were located
in SV—an increase of nearly 23%. Moreover, resembling the pattern with the lawyers and IBs, SV had
become nearly autarchic, as only 9.2% of its VCs
were extra-regional. The most telling change was
Vol:. (1234567890)
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that SV became the source of almost as many VC
directors to other regions (106) as it provided locally
(129). The percentage of local VCs declined in every
other region, as they became dependent upon SV.
This suggests that the increase in industry knowledge
in SV was so powerful that firms in other regions
sought the investments and services of SV VCs over
those in their own EE.
5.5 Non‑VC directors
Because the non-VC directors perform so many different functions, they are the most eclectic group. In
Proposition 6, following Klepper, we suggested that
during Period 1, which was at the industry’s formation, many different types of knowledge would be
needed. Thus, we expected the directors would be
sourced from a wide variety of locations. Our conjecture that in Period 1 knowledge would be widely
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Table 10  Non-VC directors by location of source and target in Period 1
Source (location of non-VC director)
Target (location of focal
firm)

Mass

NYC

SoCal

SV

Other

Total

Target % of total

Massachusetts
New York
Southern CA
Silicon Valley
Other
Total
Source % of total

43
4
0
8
17
72
6.8

11
44
10
40
58
163
15.5

4
4
37
14
18
77
7.3

10
5
16
174
34
239
22.7

20
37
42
101
301
501
47.6

88
94
105
337
428
1052
100

8.4
8.9
10.0
32.0
40.7
100
45.4 local

The “Other” category includes the other seven regions

Table 11  Non-VC directors by location of source and target in Period 3
Source (location of non-VC director)
Target (location of focal
firm)

Mass

NYC

SoCal

SV

Other

Total

Target % of total

Massachusetts
New York
Southern CA
Silicon Valley
Other
Total
Source % of total

9
3
0
6
3
21
4.2

4
6
8
12
14
44
8.9

1
1
19
18
9
48
9.7

12
9
13
131
64
229
46.2

13
19
14
23
85
154
31.0

39
38
54
190
175
496
100

7.9
7.7
10.9
38.3
35
100
40.9 local

The “Other” category includes the other seven regions

distributed was confirmed; as Table 10 indicates,
less than half (45.4%) of all non-VC directors were
local. SV was home to only 22.7% of all directors—
a lower percentage than that of its share of listing
firms (33.4%). SV barely provided the majority of
its own directors (51.6%). Remarkably, SV provided
fewer directors to other regions than NYC did (65
vs. 119). The greater dispersion of non-VC directors suggests that the useful knowledge was quite
diffused. To reinforce this perception, NYC had
only 7.2% fewer non-VC directors than did SV. The
remarkably dispersed sourcing may be because the
Internet firms were diverse and thus required not
only technologists but also advisors and connections to marketing, advertising, media, and logistic
capabilities. This likely impelled these IPO firms to
seek talent in other regions.
In Period 3 (see Table 11), the locational calculus
changed significantly as the industry matured and

Internet-related industry knowledge became more
concentrated in SV. SV now sourced of 68.9% of its
directors locally—an increase of 17.3%. Further, SV
share of the total increased dramatically to 46.2%.
With the exception of SoCal, the share for all the
other regions decreased; particularly affected were
the scattered “other” regions. Yet, in contrast to some
of the other actors, it was not autarchic and continued
to secure directors from other regions. Conversely, for
most other regions, SV now provided as many nonVC directors as did the recipient region. With the
exception of SoCal, most other regions experienced
declines with the weaker regions experiencing the
greatest decline.
The spatial dispersion of the non-VC directors
was the greatest of all EE actors and in neither
period was 50% sourced locally, though. SV was
the only region to locally service over 50% of its
non-VC directors. While in Period 3 an increasing
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number of the non-VC directors were located in
SV, it continued to source a greater percentage of
its non-VC directors from outside the region than
for any other group of ESOs. This suggests that
SV firms still felt it necessary to access knowledge
externally (Bathelt et al., 2004).
6 Discussion
Our paper addresses a number of gaps in the EE literature and also endeavors to reconnect the EE literature to that of industrial clusters. First, we considered
the location of EE actors over an industry’s life cycle,
both the startups and organizations and individuals that
assist entrepreneurs. Second, we demonstrated that the
dynamics of spatial concentration can differ between
entrepreneurial firms and EE actors. Third, we demonstrated that the locational dynamics may differ between
various EE service providers. Fourth, we provided suggestive evidence that the rise of dominant EE, in a particular industrial sector, appears to be predicated upon
developing both EE and industry knowledge.
As our HHI shows, the maturation of the Internet
industry led to some concentration of both startups
and IPO firms. And yet, SV still has not completely
dominated other regions, as startups and IPOs continued to be established throughout the US. The entrepreneurial capability necessary to establish a firm
successful enough to attract VC support and, even
to build a firm successful enough to achieve an IPO,
remains dispersed.
The location of ESOs, from the inception of the
industry, was more concentrated than that of either
the startups or IPO firms. The location of all ESO
actors became more concentrated and shifted in
favor of SV. Interestingly, for both VC and nonVC director services, SV increased the number of
directors provided internally even as it continued
to access personnel from outside the region, as
the argument made by Bathelt et al. (2004) would
suggest. The most important pipeline particularly
in Period 3 was from SV to the other regions, as
its merger of industrial and knowledge creation
led to the emergence of EE actors whose services
were desirable to Internet entrepreneurs outside the
region.
As the literature suggests, EEs are made up
of various actors providing different services to
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entrepreneurs. Our research explored the tensions
that exist in the EE literature. The first of these is
proximity to the entrepreneurs. The second is proximity to the center of industry knowledge. Industry
and EE service knowledge become co-located even
though the entrepreneurs continued to be dispersed.
The ESOs concentrated ever more powerfully, and,
in our case, ESOs in locations with generic EE
skills lost their attraction to even their local Internet
entrepreneurs.
The ESO that showed the greatest affinity for proximity was between the focal firm and its law firm.
This is unsurprising as the firm’s outside legal counsel must develop a strong in-person relationship with
the firm’s founders and leaders, as counsel must be
privy to valuable and intimate information—something only likely to occur if there are high levels of inperson trust (Suchman, 2000). As we expected, proximity only decreased from 81.5 to 74.3% in Period 3.
For legal counsel, the centrifugal force of increasing
industry knowledge does not appear to have been
sufficiently powerful to dominate the benefits of
proximity.
The location of IBs is particularly important for
those interested in EE dynamics. Even the superior
generic IB skills that NYC had for taking a firm public lost attractiveness. The merger of industry and
EE knowledge allowed SV to increase its share of
IB business. This increase may also be linked to the
increased concentration of the key financial intermediaries, the VCs.
With the exception of the entrepreneurs, the private actor that has received the greatest attention is
the VCs. The increase in the HHI concentration was
remarkable, and in Period 3, this was largely driven
by the fact that 72.1% of all VC directors were in SV.
Moreover, in Period 1, 74.4% of all SV VCs were
local, but this increased to 90.8% in Period 3—the
region had become roughly autarchic. This was reinforced by the increasing number of non-local entrepreneurs that looked to the region for the funds,
knowledge, and connections that SV’s VCs possessed. By Period 3, SV had become part of the EE
for Internet startups. This reinforces the intuition that,
as least, some EE constituents need not be proximate.
The non-VC directors provide a wide variety of
services to the firm. In Period 1, the locations of
the non-VC directors were remarkably scattered,
likely because the knowledge valuable to firms had
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not yet become concentrated. In Period 3, there
was significantly greater local concentration as SV
increasingly provided non-VC directors to other
regions. Yet, even SV continued to source non-VC
directors extra-locally. This continued spatial dispersion is likely due to the wide variety of skills
that this diverse group brings to the entrepreneurs.
The non-VC directors appear to play what Bathelt
et al. (2004) term the “pipeline function of bringing information and resources from outside the
region.” This seems to be true even for SV which
had become autarchic in terms of the other ESO
constituents studied. To return to the fundamental
insight, in the industry formation stage, startups
tend to secure EE services from a variety of locations as there is no dominant location where industry knowledge creates a competitive advantage for
the service provider. In this particular industry, we
saw SV increase its share of firms and IPOs but
even more rapidly increase its share of ESOs. The
dominance of SV indicates that local EEs actors
may find it difficult to compete with the external
ESOs if valuable industry knowledge concentrates
in a particular region. For the peripheral locations,
the centralization of ESOs may become even more
problematic, if the industry core region causes the
relocation of either new firms or ESO organizations
(Kwon & Sorenson, 2021).
7 Conclusions and limitations
Our study has limitations. The first limitation is that
it is an exploratory study of a single industry. The
location of EE actors in other industries could exhibit
different locational and evolutionary paths. A second
limitation is an artifact of our data in that it analyzes
the ESO members at the time of the IPO and may
miss those that were affiliated with the firm earlier.
This could also be the case with the non-VC directors.
Finally, we only look at four EE actors and thus omit
many others including auditors, executive recruiters, incubators, and local universities. Also, we do
not measure either EE skills or industry knowledge
directly; rather, we infer them from the increased
concentrations of ESOs within a region. For these
reasons, any generalizations and policy recommendations derived from this research should be cautious.

Yet, our ability to identify different EE actors has
the advantage of providing a more encompassing and
evolutionary perspective that includes identification
of the location of the individuals providing the service. We provide a middle ground between the rich
case studies of single regions that enumerate and
describe the various actors that assist entrepreneurs
and the quantitative studies that almost always narrowly focus on a single actor, such as the VC firm,
university, or incubators.
The EE literature has always suffered from somewhat of a schizophrenic attitude regarding the significance of industrial knowledge. While there
are aspects of the services an EE provides that are
generic and thus not industry-specific, all entrepreneurial firms are either members of an industry or
are in the process of building firms that will create a
new industry, as is our case (Feldman et al., 2005).
As the industry matures, entrepreneurs must make
decisions about whether generic EE services, found
either locally or externally, are sufficient. At the
inception of an industry, generic EE services are all
that is available. However, as the industry matures,
an industrial cluster can emerge that is able to provide EE services with industry knowledge. This was
the case for the Internet as SV soon developed such
an industry-specific advantage. When such an industry center emerges, as we showed, local generic EE
service providers may be bypassed by their local
entrepreneurs.
Policymakers wishing to build an EE should
understand that it will be difficult to provide all
services locally. Perhaps, they should focus first on
ensuring that the region develops experienced local
legal talent. To illustrate, building upon Feldman
et al. (2005), universities might contribute to the
region by hiring local attorneys to assist in licensing for their entrepreneurial spinoff firms. Similarly,
incubators could direct their tenants toward local
lawyers, as this would have a greater likelihood of
reinforcing the local EE. Developing a local VC
industry may also be a goal, but our data shows that
as the industry matures, generic local VCs appear
to be less favored. This suggests that expectations
for the local VCs should be modest, as a successful
local entrepreneur in an existing industry is likely
to search for VCs from a location where industry
knowledge is concentrated.
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The recognition that industry and EE skills are
analytically different is an important contribution,
as is the observation that such skills can be accessed
extra-regionally and this is normal. Longitudinal
research on other industries could provide a better
understanding of whether EE skills without specific
industry skills are sufficient to promote the emergence
of synergistic high-value economic development. We
found that regions such as NYC and Boston that had
generic EE service providers were ultimately edged
out by SV with its combination of industry-specific
and EE knowledge.
The interest in EEs has resulted in greater attention to the organizations that support entrepreneurship. The bulk of the quantitative research has used
panel data that treats EEs as static and not emergent

and evolving—a violation of the very premise of
what an ecosystem is. Studies of EEs should consider industry dynamics. By examining the changes
of EE actors over the life of an industry, we have
provided another perspective. Greater appreciation and attention to the context within which the
startup, its industry, the local EE, and extra-local
EE actors act can further advance EE research and
contribute to policymaking.
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Appendix 1

Table 12  Regional definitions
MA

Massachusetts

NYC
Southern California
SV
DC area

New York
Los Angeles, Orange, San Diego, Santa Barbara, and Ventura counties
Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa Clara counties
Washington, DC; Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties in Maryland; Arlington
and Fairfax Counties; and Fairfax and Alexandria in Virginia
Texas
Washington
All Midwestern states
All areas in the Eastern states, not including MA, NY, or the DC area
All areas in the Southern states, not including Texas or the DC area
All areas in the Western states, not including Washington, SV, or Southern California
SV, Southern California, NYC, and Massachusetts
DC Area, Texas, and Washington
Midwest, other East, other South, and other West

Texas
Washington
Midwest
Other East
Other South
Other West
Top 4
Second tier
Other regions
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